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This paper examines the Serb resistance in northern Kosova. A 
number of studies, over the last decade, have been performed that 
scrutinize the case of Kosova and look into the strained relations between 
Kosova Albanians and Kosova Serbs. Yet, no study has been carried out 
to explain the Serb resistance, and more importantly, its nature and its 
underpinning mechanisms. This paper intends to just that. The central 
argument it makes is that the Serb resistance in northern Kosova is a 
Serbian elite construct, made of and crammed with anti-Americanism 
sentiments. This Serb anti-Americanism is a recent phenomenon, 
constructed as a consequence of specific developments that are occurring 
in Kosova and the region, such as the stationing of the American troops 
in Kosova, the American policy towards the region, and the American 
political and diplomatic support for the new state. To formulate this 
argument, the paper adopts the framework of anti-Americanism as its 
foundation while comparing it with the socio-biological, cultural, and 
rationalist approaches to resistance. The paper supports the gist of the 
argument by drawing on recent scholarship and analyzing official 
documents, executive statements, and intellectual observations. 
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Speaking to the parliament of the Republic of Kosova, on May 
21, 2009, the U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden reiterated 
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is irreversible – absolutely irreversible.”1 Biden went even further to claim that 
the success of an independent Kosova is a priority for the Obama 
administration. On September 10, 2012, when the International Steering Group 
(ISG) announced the end of Kosova‟s supervised independence, the U.S. 
President Barack Obama stated that he welcomes and strongly supports the 
decision of ISG. Obama congratulated the government, parliament and the 
people of Kosova on what he called the “historic milestone,” in which Kosova 
takes another important step toward its rightful place in free, whole and 
peaceful Europe.2 To Balkan observers, policy makers and scholars alike, the 
Biden and Obama statements concurrently with the fact that, to date, Kosova is 
internationally recognized, as sovereign entity, by the majority of the UN 
member states3 hint at the necessity to shift the intellectual and academic 
discussion and analyses beyond independence. That is, the „status question‟ 
should no longer be central to the debate and allowed to hinder further 
analytical developments and correct understanding of contemporary issues 
facing Kosova. To put it bluntly, we must move beyond independence if we yearn 
for better understanding the case dynamics and proper policy 
recommendations. While such a shift is sure to open new intellectual and 
research venues, it does not, per se, resolve the different and manifold 
problems facing the new state. One of these problems, the Serb resistance in 
northern Kosova, is subject to scrutiny in the pages that follow.  
The northern part of Kosova is inhabited by Serb4 majority that rejects the 
authority and the legitimacy of the newest state in Europe.5 These 46,000 or so 
Serbs6 still consider that territory as part of Serbian sovereignty and, on the 
whole, they refuse to cooperate with the international civilian and security 
                                                 
1 New Kosova Report, “U.S. Vice President: Kosovo independence is irreversible,” http://www. 
newkosovareport.com/200905221797/Views-and-Analysis/us-vice-president-kosovo-
independence-is-irreversible.html (accessed December 19, 2012).  
2 See, The White House Press, “Statement by the President on the End of Kosovo‟s Supervised 
Independence,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/10/statementpresi-
dent-end-kosovo-s-supervised-independence (accessed September 10, 2012) 
3 As of today, Jan. 24, 2013, the Republic of Kosova is recognized by 98 UN member states, that is 
a total of 50.8 % of the UN member. For further information, please see: www.kosovo 
thanksyou.com 
4 Throughout this paper the term „Serbs‟ is applied to the people from the northern part of 
Kosova, those who are of Serb national origin and identity. When referring to Serbs in other 
parts of Kosova, the paper will make it clear as appropriate. Moreover, the term „Serbian‟ is 
applied to someone who is born and currently lives in the state of Serbia.  
5 On Feb. 17, 2008 the Parliament in Prishtina declared Kosova an independent and sovereign 
Republic. Following this act, Kosova received the epithet of the newest state in Europe. 
6 This is an estimated number that was provided by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2006. Given that Serbs in northern Kosova rejected the 2011 
census, this remains the most accurate public estimation. 
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personnel there, especially with Americans who are regarded occupiers.7 The 
Serb unwillingness to cooperate and their determination to resist have been 
applauded and supported by political elites in Belgrade. With the intellectual 
and financial assistance from Serbia, the Serbs in this part of the country have 
successfully established illegal parallel institutions in various sectors, such as 
those in security, education, and health.8 While these parallel illegal institutions 
are effective and play a critical role in resisting state and international actors, 
their existence begs a number of questions. What is Belgrade‟s raison d'être for 
supporting these illegal parallel structures? Why is Belgrade resolute to 
support the Serb resistance? What explains the Serb resistance in northern 
Kosova?  
The answers to the questions above and the Serb impetus for resistance, can 
be formulated and depicted using different theoretical frameworks, e.g. via 
historical ethnic hatreds,9 civilization clash,10 or democracy‟s dark side,11 
nevertheless this paper offers alternative answers and intends to provide an 
explanation for the Serb resistance in northern Kosova. It intends to do so for 
three main reasons: a) because no study, up to date, has made such an effort to 
explain the nature and the causal mechanisms of the resistance; b) to fill the gap 
in the literature pertaining to the case of Kosova and more broadly anti-
Americanism, and c) because better understanding of the Serb resistance can 
lead to more effective and efficient policies concerning this decisive political 
matter. The central argument the paper makes is that the Serb resistance in 
northern Kosova is a Serbian elite construct, made of and crammed with anti-
Americanism sentiments. This Serb anti-Americanism is a recent phenomenon 
constructed as a consequence of specific developments that are occurring in 
Kosova and the region, such as the stationing of the American troops in 
                                                 
7 See John Catalinotto and Sara Flounders, eds., Hidden Agenda: U.S./NATO Takeover of Yugoslavia 
(New York, NY: International Action Center, 2002); William Engdahl, “Kosovo‟s „Mafia State‟ 
and Camp Bondsteel: Towards a Permanent US Military Presence in Southeast Europe,” The 
Center for Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/kosovo-s-mafia-state-and-camp-
bondsteel-towards-a-permanent-us-military-presence-in-southeast-europe/30262 (accessed 
December 13, 2012); John Catalinotto (trans.), “‟Interview with Krsljanin: Serbia is an occupied 
country‟,” Workers World, http://www.workers.org/2010/world/serbia_1021/ (accessed 
December 18, 2012). 
8 For a complete list of the illegal institutions in northern Kosova, see Ylber Hysa, Amir Haziri 
and Gynen Venhari, Raporti mbi Institucionet Paralele ne Veri te Kosoves, Zyra a Kordinatorit per 
Strategjine e Veriut (Prishtine: May 2011). 
9 Robert D. Kaplan, The Balkans Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York, NY: Vintage, 1994). 
10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, NY: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
11 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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Kosova, the American policy towards the region, and the American political 
and diplomatic support for the new state. As it will become more obvious in 
the following pages, these three specific developments are perceived as the 
principal causal variables that are being constructed into a larger concept of 
Serb anti-Americanism which considerably shape the Serb resistance. Although 
anti-Americanism “can be measured through the answers individuals give to 
survey items,” it should also “be recognized that anti-Americanism as a mass 
popular phenomenon can also manifest itself in forms other than the attitudes 
revealed in opinion polls.”12 As Giacomo Chiozza rightly argued in 2009, anti-
Americanism can take the form of contentious political behavior, such as 
demonstrations, protests, resistance, riots, and other violent acts against 
American people, policies, property, or symbols.13 The manifestation of Anti-
Americanism in the form of contentious political behavior informs the 
methodology adopted in this paper. 
A number of recent studies have looked into the case of Kosova, by adopting 
different perspectives and theoretical frameworks. These studies have focused 
on a number of matters, such as security issues,14 peace-building and regime 
change,15 legal issues,16 and the interplay of religion and politics.17 What has not 
                                                 
12 Giacomo Chiozza, Anti-Americanism and the American World Order (Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 37. 
13 Ibid 
14 Ted G Carpenter, “A New Era of Turbulence in the Balkans?” Mediterranean Quarterly, 19, no. 3 
(2008): 6-22; Adem Beha and Gezim Visoka, “Human Security as 'Ethnic Security' in Kosovo,” 
Human Security Perspectives 7, no. 1 (2010): 83-101; Mark A Wolfgram, “When the Men with 
Guns Rule: Explaining Human Rights Failures in Kosovo since 1999,” Political Science Quarterly 
123 no. 3 (2008): 461-484. 
15 Gordon N Bardos, “Containing Kosovo,” Mediterranean Quarterly, 16 no. 3 (2005); 17-43; Florian 
Bieber and Soren Keil, “Power-Sharing Revisited: Lessons Learned in the Balkans?” Review of 
Central & East European Law 34, no. 4 (2009): 337-360; Elizabeth Pond, “Kosovo and Serbia after 
the French Non,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2005): 19-36; Gezim Visoka and Grace Bolton, 
“The Complex Nature and Implications of International Engagement after Kosovo's 
Independence,” Civil Wars 13, no.2 (2011): 189-214; Oisin Tansey, “Kosovo: Independence and 
Tutelage,” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 2 (2009): 153-166. 
16 James Ker-Lindsay, “Not Such as a „Sui Generis‟ Case After All: Assessing the ICJ Opinion on 
Kosovo,” Nationalities Papers 39, no. 1 (2011): 1-11; Charles A Kupchan, “Independence for 
Kosovo,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (2005): 14-20; Robert Muharremi, “Kosovo's Declaration of 
Independence: Self-Determination and Sovereignty Revisited,” Review of Central & East 
European Law 33, no. 4 (2008): 401-435; Marc Weller, “Kosovo's Final Status,” International 
Affairs 84, no. 6 (2008a): 1223-1243; Marc Weller, “The Vienna Negotiations on the Final Status 
for Kosovo,” International Affairs 84, no. 4 (2008b): 659-681; Marc Weller, Contested Statehood: 
Kosovo's Struggle for Independence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009); Marc Weller, 
“Modesty Can Be a Virtue: Judicial Economy in the ICJ Kosovo Opinion?” Leiden Journal of 
International Law 24, no. 1 (2011): 127-147. 
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been examined and explained is the Serb resistance in northern Kosova. To put 
it more precisely, the nature and the causal mechanisms of the resistance need 
to be explained, so that better understanding of the phenomenon could come 
into view. In the following pages, this paper intends to do just that by looking 
at a number of complex and clashing relationships among Serbian political and 
religious elites, the Serb masses in northern Kosova, and the American policies 
and power in the area.  
The American policies and power have encountered different forms and 
scope of resistance globally. Like the American power which is known for its 
array of forces, so too is the resistance to that power. In the post-Cold War 
world, resistance to American policies and power has been further diversified, 
ranging from those who take to the streets and the media campaign against 
America to those who are willing to kill and die in order to harm it.18 As it will 
become more apparent in the subsequent pages, the Serb resistance in northern 
Kosova lies somewhere in-between these two different forms of anti-
Americanisms, and a potential „aspirant‟ to radicalize itself. Another important 
facet of the resistance and a significant ingredient of this study are the Serb 
masses in northern Kosova. As it will be illustrated below, Serbian political and 
religious elites have succeeded in manipulating and turning the Serb masses in 
this part of Kosova into their „political instrument.‟ In the last fourteen years, 
Belgrade has been very conscious to use the Serb population in Kosova as a 
source that can be manipulated at any time for domestic or/and foreign policy 
purposes. While Belgrade‟s strategy is working well for the elites in Belgrade, 
the Serbs in northern Kosova have turned themselves into “prisoners in their 
own land.”19  
Explaining the Serb resistance is important for a number of reasons. First, 
the resistance shapes the political environment in which politics and policy are 
developed. Not only state, institutions, and legislation are affected by the 
resistance, but also the private stakeholders who operate and interact with or 
influence the system. Moreover, the resistance also affects the political culture 
in Kosova. It affects popular participation in democratic processes like elections 
and civic engagement. Second, the resistance complicates the integration 
processes of both Kosova and Serbia into regional and international 
                                                                                                                                   
17 Gezim Krasniqi, “The „Forbidden Fruit‟: Islam and Politics of Identity in Kosovo and Macedo-
nia,” Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies 11, no. 2(2011: 191-207; Robert J Pranger, 
“The Milosevic and Islamization Factors: Writing Contemporary History in the Balkans,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 22, no.1 (2011): 1-14. 
18 Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century?” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004), p. 5. 
19 Benjamin Schett, “Prisoners in their own Land: The Struggle and Resistance of Serbs in Koso-
vo.” The Center for Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/prisoners-in-their-own-land-
the-struggle-and-resistance-of-serbs-in-kosovo/28178 (accessed December 10, 2012). 
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institutions. Serbia‟s attempt to prevent the integration of Kosova into 
international mechanisms, by supporting the resistance which undermines 
Kosova‟s international image in the global arena, has proven costly, especially 
in regards to its EU perspective. Third, the resistance taints how the rest of the 
world (mis)understands what is happening in northern Kosova. Frequently, 
when outside observers write on or comment about what is going on in 
northern Kosova, ethnic rivalry, historical animosity, and religious antagonism 
dominate in their explanations. For an unidentified reason, anti-Americanism, 
as an explanation for the resistance, has been completely rejected up to now. 
Finally, the Serb resistance is important because it has implications for the 
broader debate on anti-Americanisms. In 2007, Peter Katzenstein and Robert 
Keohane argued that the most interesting cases of anti-Americanism are those 
in which more than one form of anti-Americanism is at work.20 The subsequent 
pages will illustrate how the Serb resistance in northern Kosova is composed of 
more than one form of anti-Americanism. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part, the resistance theory and 
its central tenets are reviewed before the Serb resistance in northern Kosova is 
situated within the broader theoretical context. The section that follows, 
reviews three alternative approaches, socio-biological, culturalist and 
rationalist, and makes an effort to understand the strengths and weaknesses of 
these approaches as they are tested against the Serbs resistance in northern 
Kosova. The third part of this paper explores the concept of anti-Americanism 
and elaborates how anti-Americanism in Kosova was constructed through the 
three phases of development. In the fourth part, the nature and the causal 
mechanisms of the resistance are laid out. In conclusion, the paper reviews the 
central argument and makes some final observations about the Serbs resistance 
in northern Kosova.  
 
1. Resistance Theory and Serb Resistance in Kosova 
Resistance theory has its early roots on Roman, canon (church), and 
medieval law. When carefully reviewed, these early systems and historical 
periods are characterized by two governing concepts: authority and freedom. 
As a rule, individual or group violent defense against aggression was justified 
under the Roman law, but the same was not true under the canon and medieval 
law. Under the latter two systems, at best, individuals were allowed to hold a 
contract with their ruler, thus their life and property could be secured. In 
centuries that followed these historical periods, individual and group freedom 
became further limited as power significantly shifted toward authority/ruler.  
                                                 
20 Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O Keohane (eds.), Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 29. 
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Resistance theory gained considerable significance in the century leading to 
the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Hugo Grotius, in his work De Jure Belli ac Pacis 
recognized the individual‟s right to resist injustice, but also reasoned that the 
right of individual and group resistance could be limited if the destruction and 
harm to the state is greater. In what is considered a counter-balance argument, 
John Locke, in his The Second Treatise of Civil Government makes the argument in 
favor of popular resistance. Locke even claims that people should be able to 
restore their ruler/authority if the power given by them is misused. The 
arguments advanced by Grotius and Locke serve as the „building blocks‟ four 
our modern understanding of the resistance theory and the relationship 
between power and resistance.  
More recently, the concepts of power and resistance became central to the 
works of a number of influential scholars, including Michel Foucault, Stephen 
Gill and David Chandler.21 To Foucault, resistance is the “odd element within 
power relations. Resistance is what eludes power, and power targets resistance 
as its adversary. Resistance is what threatens power; hence it stands against 
power as an adversary.”22 Although Foucault realized that power, nearly in all 
instances, is much more encompassing and spread than resistance, he insisted 
that resistance is still preferable to submission. To Foucault, power and 
resistance are very much in a permanent antagonistic relationship. Foucault‟s 
idea of resistance and his understanding of power as a form of social control 
have been widely influential in both academic and policy circles. A number of 
recent studies,23 as well as conceptions underlying the Serb resistance in 
northern Kosova appear to be directly or indirectly influenced by Foucault‟s 
ideas and his understanding of the relationship between power and resistance. 
Relying on Foucault‟s framework, this paper comprehends the Serb 
resistance in northern Kosova, primarily, as a resistance against power. That is, 
a resistance against the four sources of American power: ideological, economic, 
military, and political.24 This abundance of American power in Kosova has 
been constructed, by the Serbian political and religious elites in Belgrade, and 
inculcated in the minds of Serbs as a threat to the Kosova Serb identity and to 
the Serbian nation at large. Such construction affects and shapes the local 
                                                 
21 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York, NY: Vintage, 1990); 
Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008); David Chandler, Hollow Hegemony: Rethinking Global Politics, Power and 
Resistance (New York, NY: Pluto Press, 2009). 
22 See, Brent L Pickett, “Foucault and the Politics of Resistance,” Polity 28, no. 4 (1996): 445-466. 
23 Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross (eds.), Anti-Americanism (New York, NY: New York University 
Press, 2004); Russell A Berman, Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem (Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institution Press, 2004); Chiozza, Anti-Americanism and the American World Order. 
24 For more on these sources of power, see Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, pp. 30-33 
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political calculations and the dynamics of the resistance. However, the 
abundance of American power and the Serb will to resist should not imply that 
the historical relations between Kosova Serbs and Kosova Albanians, which are 
well covered and sufficiently articulated by a number of studies,25 are no longer 
relevant. To put it frankly, these four sources of American power have been 
constructed, by the Serbian elites, in a way that overwhelm almost any past or 
present actor, concern, or relationship. The American „threat‟ transcends 
historical disputes, religious antagonism, and civilization clashes. This „threat‟ 
is constructed in a way that is understood as the greatest contemporary threat 
to Serb survival, culture, identity, and socio-economic welfare, and something 
that must be resisted at all costs. 
While the Serb resistance in northern Kosova is a recent construct (as it will 
be shown later), the Serb/ian tradition of resistance is not. Over the centuries, 
they have been known for their resistance and uprisings against Ottoman 
authority, as well as more recently against European powers that ruled the area 
in early 20th century.26 Since the end of the Cold War, particularly with the 
increased American involvement in the Balkans during the 1990s and the 
American-led NATO bombardment of former Yugoslavia in 1999, anti-
Americanism has become increasingly popular among Serb/ians. Different 
rationales can be applied to explain this rising anti-Americanism. For example, 
one can argue that Serb/ians hate America and its power because Americans 
used NATO as a „tool‟ to bombard Yugoslavia in 1999. Or, one could assert that 
America and its policies are becoming increasingly hated after the so called 
engineered coup led by American agencies to overthrow government in 
Belgrade in 2000.27 Recently, Ivan Krastev came up with an interesting 
conclusion for why America is hated in the Balkans. Krastev argued that in the 
case of Balkans, America is hated for being pro-Albanian.28 Krastev‟s claim 
leads us toward the assumption that anti-Americanism in northern Kosova 
                                                 
25 For examples, see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York, NY: New York University 
Press, 1998); Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1998); Miranda Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History (New 
York, NY: I. B. Tauris, 2001); James Pettifer, Kosova Express: A Journey in Wartime (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2005); Tim Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008); Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic 
Cleansing in the Twentieth Century (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); James Pettifer, 
The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948-2001 (London: Hurst, 
2012). 
26 Mark Biondich, The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violence since 1878 (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), especially chapters 1-3. 
27 See, John Catalinotto (trans.), “‟Interview with Krsljanin.” 
28 Krastev, “Anti-American Century?” p. 6 
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might be more complex than just a resistance to American ideals, policies, and 
power.  
Indeed, as the following pages will elaborate, the Serb resistance in northern 
Kosova is a complex puzzle, composed of various and conflicting goals, ideas, 
sentiments, and directed against multiple potential opponents. This complex 
characterization of the resistance makes its nature vague and erratic, which 
necessitates the need to consider other alternative approaches that can account 
for explaining different potential aspects of the resistance. Although, the three 
alternatives, socio-biological, cultural and rationalist approaches to resistance 
offer significant insights into the mechanisms underpinning the resistance, this 
paper relies on the framework of anti-Americanism to provide the most logical 
and plausible explanation for the Serb resistance in northern Kosova. Now, the 
paper turns its attention to the three alternatives. 
 
2. Alternatives: Socio-Biological, Cultural and Rationalist 
2.1 The Socio-Biological Approach: The Genes of Resistance 
Central to the Darwinian classical theory is the concept of individual 
selection. The socio-biological approach, however, places greater emphasis on 
the collective level and on what Robert Wallace called the “reproductive 
imperative.”29 In this approach, the principle of kin selection and the idea of 
inclusive fitness appear to be of special importance. Relying on that idea and 
the biological principles that underpin social issues, a number of scholars have 
effectively articulated social behavior in various settings.30 According to this 
perspective, the ultimate goal of any organism, including humans, is to survive 
and reproduce. Therefore, all behavior is selfish, or at least pragmatic, at its 
most fundamental level. One loves its own kind and resists domination by 
others because that is the most effective means to maintain effective 
reproduction.  
Two concepts - domination and selfishness - stand out when reviewing this 
perspective. When contextualizing the Serb resistance within this viewpoint, 
the following arguments are formulated. First, the Serb genes and their basic 
need to survive are the explanations for the resistance. In this view, the local 
Serbs in northern Kosova are resisting because their kin and race are threatened 
with elimination. To survive and be able to reproduce, the Serbs must resist the 
threat coming from both the Kosova Albanians and the American power, which 
are manifested in the forms of ethnic, economic, ideological, and political 
                                                 
29 Robert Wallace, The Genesis Factor (New York, NY: Morrow & Co, 1979). 
30 For example, see Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1989); Pierre Van der Berghe, “Does Race Matter?” Nations and Nationalism 1, no. 3 (1995): 357-
68; Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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domination. Dusan Batakovic is the most prominent scholar who represents 
this viewpoint.31 To him, the Albanian-led government in Kosova is using, 
what he calls, the Albanian „war concept‟ to govern the country, which aims at 
making life impossible for Serbs and reducing the number of Serbs, so they 
could no longer represent a tangible threat to the whole strategy of exclusive 
ethnic domination. According to Batakovic, the Albanian majority in Kosova 
(supported by Americans) are involved in a campaign that complicates and 
prevents the Serb reproduction. Based on this viewpoint, the Serb resistance, 
that we are current witnessing in northern Kosova, is justified as an act against 
this domination campaign.  
Second, the Serbs are resisting because it is in their self-interest to do so. On 
the one hand, Serb survival is best assured when they have control over the 
scarce resources, territory, and the level of interaction with their kin in Serbia. 
Resistance is seen as the most effective mechanism to stop those who run 
counter to those interests. Being in such position, Serbs can easily manage and 
utilize these possessions in the most appropriate way that assures their survival 
and reproduction. On the other hand, being in charge of these assets allows 
them to refuse access to „the other‟ (i.e. Kosova Albanians and Americans) over 
the same resources. That, Serbs argue, strengthens their relative position and 
keeps the „occupiers‟ at distance. To those well informed with the current 
events in northern Kosova, roadblocks and barricades are the living testimonies 
of this phenomenon.  
Finally, the Serbs are resisting because they have been victimized in the 
recent past and are trying to prevent such acts from recurring against them. 
With the help from Belgrade, Serb leaders in northern Kosova have successfully 
constructed their identity based on „suffering‟ and „injustices‟ done to them, 
especially since 1999. Nowadays, Serbs have been insistent to narrate the Serb 
identity as victim identity. They believe that the suffering and the injustices 
they have gone through bestow them a special right to any form and scope of 
resistance. Moreover, based on this constructed identity of victimhood and 
suffering, they have been firm to reject Kosova institutions and retain strong 
stand against the American power in Kosova.  
While this perspective deserves some credit for trying to explain the Serb 
resistance, there are three main problems with it. First, this viewpoint cannot 
sufficiently explain the Serb resistance as a social action. Not everyone involved 
                                                 
31 Dusan Batakovic, “Kosovo: From Separation to Integration,” Serbian Studies: Journal of the North 
American Society for Serbian Studies 18, no. 2 (2004): 311-20; Dusan Batakovic, “The Kosovo Dile-
mma: Albanian War Concept vs. Serbian Peaceful Compromise,” Serbian Studies: Journal of the 
North American Society for Serbian Studies 20, no. 2 (2006): 213-29; Dusan Batakovic, “Surviving 
in Ghetto-like Enclaves: The Serbs of Kosovo and Metohija 1999-2007,” in Kosovo and Metohija: 
Living in the Enclaves (Belgrade, Serbia: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2007), pp. 239-263. 
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in the resistance is driven by „natural aggression.‟ Rational and instrumental 
actions are just as common, if not more ordinary, among those who resist. Most 
of the protests, roadblocks, and barricades in northern Kosova are actually 
initiated or installed by local businessmen and entrepreneurs32 who are 
dissatisfied with tax and transportation laws, and regulations between their 
country of residence (Kosova) and their mother country (Serbia). In short, the 
Serb level of sociality is much more complex than just the basic need to survive. 
Serbs are involved, daily, in a complex web of social actions and interactions, 
and have integrated themselves into the illegal institutions and organizations in 
northern Kosova that are able to generate and re-generate new social dynamics. 
Second, by reducing the resistance to the biological level, this viewpoint 
misses on the social action, mobilization, systematic use of mechanisms and 
coordination that is required for the resistance. Social action and the 
mobilization of the local Serbs have been feasible only with the financial and 
human support from Belgrade. The financial and human resources are critical 
not only for mobilization, but also because they serve as systematic 
mechanisms feeding the resistance. For example, the chief mechanism that 
coordinates the resistance actions in northern Kosova is the director of the 
Serbian government office for Kosova (currently, Aleksandar Vulin). The illegal 
involvement of Serbia into the internal affairs of its southern neighbor best 
speaks of how the resistance is a social construct that is perhaps created at a 
biological level, but soon becomes a force for particular political purpose. 
Third, the capabilities to organize large scale resistance have little to do with 
Serb „natural aggression‟ and a great deal to do with political institutions, 
modern nation-state, ideological doctrine, and geopolitics. Using different 
methods and mechanisms, Serbia successfully installed its illegal institutions in 
northern Kosova and convinced the local Serbs to accept and utilize them. 
Moreover, the concept of nation-state and the Serb nationalist ideology came to 
define not only the institutions but also the resistance. And finally, Serbia has 
been prudent and persistent to depict itself, among Serbs, as the natural ally of 
Russia, implying that the Serb resistance to American power is not only in their 
favor but also vital to the brotherly Russo-Serbian alliance. Among the many 
and various political and religious symbols that one finds within the resistance, 
are Vladimir Putin‟s portrait and the Russian flag. Vladimir Putin has even 
been declared an „honorary citizen of Kosovo‟ by Serbs.33 With confidence, we 
                                                 
32 See “Northern Kosovo businessmen announce new protests,” Tanjug, http://www.tanjug.rs/ 
news/70561/northern-kosovo-businessmen-announce-new-protests.htm (accessed December 
23, 2012). 
33 See “‟Kosovar Serbs Declare Putin „Honorary Citizen of Kosovo,‟” Radio Free Europe, 
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can conclude that the Serb resistance is much more a social and anti-imperial 
phenomenon than a biological fact.  
 
2.2 The Cultural Approach: Religion, Symbols, and Myths 
From the early work of Arnold Toynbee34 to more recent studies of Samuel 
Huntington35 and Marc Ross,36 cultural explanations of phenomena such as 
war, violence, and resistance have gained a great deal of popularity. The Balkan 
wars of 1990s, the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq have all been subject to cultural scrutiny. Virtually all cultural 
explanations, regardless of the fact that they accentuate differences in cultural 
practices, religious beliefs or civilization clashes, perceive human beings as 
norm-driven and their actions as norm-centered. That is, cultural norms guide 
behavior of people within social groups as well as their actions in any give 
situation. In the context of this paper, then, the Serb culture is understood as 
the „fabric‟ whereas the Serb resistance as a product that derives from it. This 
paper identifies three cultural features through which the Serb resistance in 
northern Kosova can be best delineated: religion, symbolism, and mythology.  
According to the religious trait of this approach, the Serbs are morally and 
divinely obligated to resist, what they call, the foreign occupation of the cradle 
of their civilization. Indoctrinated by the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbs 
perceive themselves as God‟s „chosen people‟ and in „covenant‟ with God,37 
making them the “defender of the faith.”38 These ideas and sentiments lead to a 
sense of collectivity and solidarity which facilitate the organization and 
execution of resistance acts. Both, the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian 
state have been very resolute to support not only the Serb resistance in northern 
Kosova, as a moral and divine duty, but also the protection of the territory of 
Kosova from „occupiers‟. Just recently, Patriarch Irinej pledged the support to 
the Serbian state over Kosova, claiming that “we [the church] are doing all we 
                                                 
34 Arnold J Toynbee, War and Civilization: Selections from a Study of History (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1950). 
35 Samuel P Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-50; 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations. 
36 Marc Ross, “The Political Psychology of Competing Narratives: September 11 and Beyond,” in 
Understanding September 11, eds. Craig Calhoun, Paul Pierce and Ashley Timmer (New York, 
NY: The New Press, 2002); Marc Ross, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
37 For more on these concepts, see Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nations (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999); Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of 
National Identity (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
38 On this concept, see Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, p. 42. 
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can to continue defending, and defend Kosovo.”39 It is this official position of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church that feeds the governmental sentiments in 
Belgrade as well as the Serb resistance in the ground, and creates a situation 
where religious and cultural symbols become subject to manipulation and 
politicization.  
Among the many symbols that have been extremely politicized and 
manipulated, by Serbian politicians and religious leaders, is the idea of Kosova. 
Belgrade has been quite successful in reconstructing Kosova as the historical 
„symbol‟ of Serb resistance and a national-religious asset that must be fully 
preserved at all costs.40 Frequently, Kosova is depicted as a symbol of Serb 
identity, language, culture, and the guardian of Christianity and Europe. More 
grippingly, Kosova is depicted as a symbol of suffering and struggle against the 
barbarians and of cultural survival against the odds.41 By reconstructing 
Kosova in that fashion, political and religious leaders have effectively 
connected the past with the present, and instilled historical and cultural 
dimensions in the Serb resistance. This has been possible only through the use 
of Serbian mythology, which was formed in the nineteenth century42 to cope 
with Ottoman occupation and the hardships of peasant life. 
The Kosova myth has been a critical part of the Serb collective psyche and 
historical consciousness. The mythologies surrounding Kosova are the 
foundations for the Serbian cultural identity and a prism through which Serbs 
view and interpret their past, present, and future. Former American 
ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, argued that the defining 
historical event for all Serbs is the battle of Kosova (1389) and that event defines 
their nationhood, their Christianity against the infidel, and their self-styled role 
as Europe‟s protectors.43 More recently, the historian Melissa Bokovoy, 
describing the passion that Serbs have for Kosova, argued that Serbs have a 
pathological desire to give up their livelihoods and lives to defend it.44 And the 
                                                 
39 See “Patriarch Pledges Support to State over Kosovo,” B92, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/ 
society-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=11&dd=19&nav_id=83235 (accessed January 2, 2013). 
40 See “Kostunica: Kosovo Has No Price,” B92, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-
article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=09&nav_id=47591 (accessed January 9, 2013). 
41 For instance, see Stevan Pavlowitch, Serbia: The History of an Idea (New York, NY: New York 
University Press, 2002); John K Cox, The History of Serbia (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
2002). 
42 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 79 
43 Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York, NY: 
Times Books, 1996), p. 11. 
44 Melissa Bokovoy, “Scattered Graves, Ordered Cemeteries – Commemorating Serbia‟s Wars of 
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late political scientist Alex Dragnich argued that Kosova illustrates to Serbs the 
need to struggle, sacrifice, and maintain liberty, and is considered one of the 
cornerstones of Serb consciousness.45 Just as the claims above point out, Kosova 
myth is one significant mechanism that has been reconstructed and aimed at 
making the Serb resistance experience socially and politically meaningful. Just 
like any war or violence, the Serb resistance in northern Kosova also requires 
coherent and believable narratives, and disparate binary codes that separate the 
sacred from the profane, good from evil, and the rational from the irrational.46 
Zimmerman rightly asserted that, “Their [Serbian] defect is an obsession with 
their own history; their hearts are in the past, not in the future.”47 
While there is much to praise in the cultural approach, this viewpoint is 
unable to explain how culture, when separated from politics, is a causal force 
for the resistance. Cultural codes and symbols, collective interpretation, and 
public expression certainly make the resistance smoother and meaningful, but 
they do not themselves create resistance. Materiality, rationality, and power 
calculations are important aspects of life in northern Kosova; thus, rather than 
being a causal force, culture is an important supplement to politically initiated 
actions. Finally, reducing resistance to culture, as this approach does, is 
misleading and dangerous. It is misleading because it depicts multiculturalism 
and multi-religious coexistence in Kosova as unfeasible. The peaceful 
coexistence between Kosova Albanians and other cultural groups (e.g. Roma, 
Bosniaks, Turks, and Serbs in other parts of Kosova) invalidates such an 
argument that multiculturalism is impractical in the new state. Reducing 
resistance to culture is dangerous because it can easily radicalize to violence 
and potentially war. The recent developments in Egypt, Libya, and Syria best 
speak for such a possible radicalization. 
 
2.3 The Rationalist Approach: A Resource Struggle 
The underlying assumption of this approach is rationality. Individuals make 
decisions or take actions based on utility maximization. That is, individuals 
want more than less of a good. As such, the approach is often associated with 
neoclassical economic model in which individuals (like firms) are understood 
as rational and egoistic. However, as Margaret Levi shows, rational approach 
“derives from but is decidedly not neoclassical economics” and it has “a richer 
                                                 
45 Alex Dragnich, Serbia’s Historical Heritage (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 
30. 
46 See Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998). 
47 Warren Zimmerman, “The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia.” Foreign 
Affairs 74, no. 2 (1995), p. 3. 
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conception of reasoned choice, interactions, and constrains.”48 Thus, the 
rational approach is a framework that helps us understand both economic and 
social behavior. Moreover, the approach is not limited to one basic unit of 
analysis: individuals. As Mark Pollack rightly demonstrated in 2006, rational 
approach can, for example, take individuals, organizations or states as their 
basic unit of analysis. It can adopt a „thick‟ conception of rationality, in which 
actors are assumed to be narrowly self-interested, or a „thin‟ conception, in 
which rational actors may be self-interested or altruistic and may seek a variety 
of goals such as wealth and power.49 Pollack‟s „thin‟ conception of rationality 
appears useful for our purposes given that we are seeking to explore and 
understand the role the state (Serbia), the organization (i.e. Serbian Orthodox 
Church), and the group (i.e. Serb leaders) play in political and social 
developments, such as the Serb resistance in northern Kosova.  
To provide a rational explanation of the Serb resistance we must seriously 
take into consideration at least four actors: the Serbian government, Serbian 
Orthodox Church, the Serb leaders, and Serb masses in northern Kosova; and 
their different goals, motivations and preferences. According to this viewpoint, 
the support for the Serb resistance from the Serbian government officials is 
motivated by two goals: to stay in power, and maintain political and economic 
control over as much territory as possible. By supporting and assisting the 
resistance, via various channels (e.g. nationalistic statements, financial assets), 
the politicians in Belgrade gain political credibility which is likely to help them 
hold on to power. Economically, it is rational for the state of Serbia to support 
the resistance because it allows her to maintain full access to the market in 
northern Kosova. By doing so, Serbian politicians not only satisfy their political 
needs but also the Serbian investors and firms; at the same time denying access 
to the Kosova government and American investors. 
The support for the resistance, by the Serbian Orthodox Church, is 
motivated by two goals: preserving its „control power‟ over Serbian culture and 
heritage in Kosova, and dominating Serb souls. Here, the „goods‟ („control 
power‟ and domination) are not defined in pure economic sense, rather they 
are considered as „religious goods‟ and very much spiritual. In this context, the 
church is acting rationally in supporting the resistance because it brings her 
more than less of those goods. That is, the support for the resistance assures the 
church more „control power‟ over Serbian cultural and traditional sites in 
                                                 
48 Margaret Levi, “Reconsiderations of Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,” 
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Kosova, as well as over the Serb souls in the new state. Just as Pollack rightly 
asserted, the goals of the actors need not necessarily be defined in terms of 
wealth. Thus, the case of the Serbian Orthodox Church illustrates that goals can 
differ from wealth. 
Another group that supports the resistance, and is a vital part of it, is the 
Serb leaders. This group, composed mainly of local business-leaders and 
entrepreneurs, is motivated by the economic and political opportunities that 
have been created as a result of the status quo in northern Kosova. 
Economically, they are in an ideal position to maximize their wealth. For 
example, all goods (below 3.5 tons of weight) that enter from and leave to 
Serbia from northern Kosova are subject to no customs clearance. Moreover, 
they are subject to no customs clearance even when transporting in or trading 
with other parts of Kosova, and no subject to taxation from the central 
government. This state of economic affairs allows them, at very low cost, to 
support the status quo, while maximizing the benefits. This group has also 
benefited politically from supporting the resistance. Many of the business elites 
have now taken additional political roles in northern Kosova50 and have been 
firm to resist not only alterations to the status quo but also anyone threatening 
the current state of affairs.  
Finally, the Serb masses are also going after their benefits. Their main goal is 
access to power and resources, through which they can maximize their utility. 
Because of the connections with and the dependence on the Serb elites, the 
masses are subject to a great number of constrains. While the true intentions for 
participating in the resistance, for some within the masses, may be questioned, 
the rational is that they are acting according to their economic gains and 
supposedly are making individual economic gains. Their support for and 
participation in the resistance also makes sense in rational terms when 
considering that under the Kosova government the Serbs are only a minority 
and they will face the problem of „credible commitment‟.51 According to this 
problem, Serbs are escaping the unsure full representation and protection that 
they would have under the government in Kosova. As a consequence 
individual Serbs in the north decide that it is more rational to resist rather than 
wait and see whether their rights will be respected.  
The actions and the behavior of the four rational actors reflect their choices 
as they try to maximize their benefits and minimize the costs. The Serbian state 
                                                 
50 See Anita McKinna, “Who‟s Who among Northern Kosovo‟s Political Actors,” Balkan Analysis, 
http://www.balkanalysis.com/kosovo/2012/09/18/whos-who-among-northern-kosovos-
political-actors/ (accessed January 2, 2013). 
51 For more on this concept, see James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation 
of International Disputes,” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577-592. 
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supports the resistance because it is in its political, economic and security 
interest to do so. While the costs for supporting the resistance are moderate, the 
benefits are perceived to be enormously high for Serbian political elites. The 
Serbian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, may not be able to extract wealth 
by supporting the resistance, but certainly can increase its „control power‟ and 
gain social prestige. The group that is, arguably, benefiting the most from the 
status quo, with almost no costs involved, is the Serb elites in northern Kosova. 
Finally, the masses are acting rationally because of constrains they are subject 
to, as well as the fact that they are better off being a majority in a contested area 
than being a minority under Kosova government.  
 This approach seems useful if one is looking to predict the future actions of 
actors involved in the resistance. However, this viewpoint has a hard time 
explaining the resistance as a social action which is much messier and complex 
than simple individual/group rationality. First, by reducing the resistance to 
the simple benefit maximization, the approach does not tell us much about the 
nature and the character of the resistance. How and when did the resistance 
come into being? What is the validity of actors‟ motivations? What is the nature 
of the resistance? Is there a correlation between the Serb resistance and the 
American presence in Kosova and region? Second, the resistance is a dynamic, 
interactive, and complex process. It cannot be reduced to a simple matrix of 
individual rationality. The Serb resistance, when carefully examined, is richer 
and messier. Just like the first two approach, the rational perspective also seems 
to have a hard time explaining the Serb resistance in a logical and plausible 
fashion. Having reviewed the socio-biological, culturalist, and rational 
approaches, the paper will now turn attention to the next section. 
 
3. Anti-Americanism and the Serb Resistance in Northern Kosova 
The central argument this paper makes is that the Serb resistance in northern 
Kosova is a Serbian elite construct, made of and crammed with Anti-
Americanism sentiments. Recently, anti-Americanism has received a great deal 
of attention from academics, journalists, and think tanks;52 however, no 
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universal definition of the concept exists. For example, Paul Hollander uses the 
term anti-Americanism “to denote a particular mind-set, an attitude of distaste, 
aversion, or intense hostility the roots of which may be found in matters 
unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society or the foreign 
policies of the United States.”53 For Jan Ross, anti-Americanism is the new 
global ideology that runs deeper than mere policy disputes.54 And according to 
Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, anti-Americanism is “a psychological 
tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society 
in general.”55 More recently, Giacomo Chiozza has defined anti-Americanism 
as “the opposition to America, its name, its ideals, and its actions.”56 If 
America‟s ideals and actions are to be realized through its foreign policy, as 
Makdisi suggests that they are,57 then a synthesis of Chiozza‟s definition with 
Makdisi‟s suggestion appear useful and workable for our purposes.  
Anti-Americanism, as the opposition to the name America, its ideals, and its 
actions, in northern Kosova is a recent phenomenon. It was „born‟ on March 24, 
1999. It very much developed through three phases, with the third phase still 
under progress. When American-led NATO launched an air campaign to halt 
the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding in Kosova, Serbian 
political and religious elites (led by Slobodan Milosevic) were furious to 
condemn the campaign, label it an attack on their nation, and start planting the 
seeds of this anti-Americanism. The years from 1999 to 2008 define the first 
phase of development of anti-Americanism among Serbs in Kosova. Even 
though Milosevic himself, arguably, became an anti-American in the early 
years of 1990s, his anti-Americanism ideas did not fully spread to and 
internalized by Kosova Serbs until 1999. In an article that was published in 
Foreign Affairs, Warren Zimmermann wrote about his conversations with 
Milosevic and provided us with a good description of his personality and what 
was probably circulating in his mind.58 Zimmermann, first and foremost, 
characterized him as someone with the syndrome of malignant narcissism, and 
cynic about Western democratic values and institutions. Moreover, 
Zimmerman also described him as a dishonest man, someone that always 
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avoided personal responsibilities.59 Enraged by the American-led NATO 
campaign and other adverse events taking place in Kosova, Serbs by and large 
sympathized and began to internalize Milosevic‟s ideas, his cynicism about 
Western democratic values, and his hatred towards American power and 
policies. Although Milosevic was sent to The Hague to stand trial for charges of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, and died there on March of 2006, his 
successors continued in his tradition of accusing the West, especially America, 
for all the instability and insecurity in Kosova and the region. Just recently, the 
current Serbian president Tomislav Nikolic, former ally of Milosevic, in an 
attempt to reassure the Serbs that he is following the steps of Milosevic (i.e. 
opposing the „occupation‟ of Kosova by America) and depict the status quo in 
Kosova as absolutely insecure, claimed that he believes that Serbs in Kosova are 
living under the threat of genocide.60 Such statements are not only misleading, 
politically regressive and perilous, but also alimentary for the resistance. In 
brief, the seeds of anti-Americanism which were planted by Milosevic, fourteen 
years ago, continue to be cultivated and re-constructed by his successors, and 
have come to play a key role in the Serb resistance in northern Kosova. 
Anti-Americanism in northern Kosova gained further momentum and 
robustness on February 17, 2008. When Kosova declared its independence, 
Serbian political elites, including then-President Boris Tadic and then-Prime 
Minister Vojislav Kostunica, condemned the act, called Kosova a “false” state, 
and argued that “Kosovo was propped up unlawfully by the United States.”61 
This was the beginning of the second phase of development of Serb anti-
Americanism in northern Kosova. Shortly after Kosova‟s declaration of 
independence, groups of people took the street in Serbia, set the American 
embassy in Belgrade on fire, burned down the American flags, and broke into a 
McDonald‟s to destroy all its interior. These violent acts were all carried in the 
name of the hate against America, its ideals, policies, property, and symbols. 
Moreover, speaking to the crowd in Belgrade, Kostunica reassured the 
Serb/ians once again that “As long as we [Serb/ians] live, Kosovo is Serbia,” 
and that “We [Serb/ians] are not alone in our fight, President Putin is with 
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us.”62 Kostunica did not mention America directly, but his reference to Putin 
indirectly suggests that he is rather expressing his anti-Americanism and 
conveying the Americans that he is in fight against them. Not long after all this, 
a number of outside intellectual observers (e.g. Sara Flounders, Nebojsa Malic, 
and Srdja Trifkovic) joined Kostunica and other Serbian leaders in laying the 
blame on America for what was happening in the area. Both politicians and 
intellectual observers alike, started accusing America for supporting a state that 
is led by radical Muslims,63 linked to organized crime,64 led by bandits,65 and 
was stolen from Serbia.66 Sara Flounders even accused America for what she 
calls the direct colonization of Kosova.67 While these political statements and 
intellectual observations about the „new reality‟68 are far from the actuality in 
the ground, they have nevertheless been significantly influential and 
stimulating for political and religious elites in Belgrade and in northern 
Kosova. Influenced and motivated by such intellectual and political statements, 
elites in Belgrade have succeeded in constructing the Serb resistance in 
northern Kosova, first and foremost, as a resistance against American power 
and policies in the area. 
The third phase of development of anti-Americanism among Serbs in 
northern Kosova is under progress. It started on July 22, 2010 when the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared that Kosova‟s declaration of 
independence did not violate general international law.69 While the ICJ decision 
confirmed the legality of the new state, to Serbian political and religious elites 
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68 This term is adopted to suggest that with the independence of Kosova, the opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), and with the end of supervised independence of Kosova 
we are living a new reality in the area. 
69 International Court of Justice, “Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of 
independence in respect of Kosovo,” International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/16010.pdf (accessed January 5, 2013) 
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this was yet another unjust and deadly imperial attack on Serbian sovereignty. 
To most Serb/ian observes the legal proceeding in the ICJ was simply a „battle‟ 
between Serbia and American power. After few consecutive diplomatic and 
legal defeats, since 1999,70 Serbian political elites are now beginning to 
understand that no realistic legal, military and political chance of bringing 
Kosova back under Serbian sovereignty exists.71 Hence, the only chance to 
maintain influence over northern Kosova is by supporting the resistance. The 
American policy to support democracy and the inclusive institutions of the new 
state has further accelerated the Serb resistance and the Serbian determination 
for support. The resistance against Serb integration into Kosova has been 
constructed in a way that depicts the American support for Kosova institutions 
as an imperialist attempt to enslave the Serbs. It is these anti-American beliefs 
and sentiments that notably inform the contentious political behavior in 
northern Kosova. Contentious political behavior, protesting, resisting, and 
acting violently, among Serbs in the north has now been internalized and 
become an ordinary receipt for the local population. 
Anti-Americanism in northern Kosova is under progress and unpredictable. 
The phenomenon should be a concern to both policy-makers and scholars alike. 
The resistance can take a radical turn if not properly and seriously governed. 
Although the main purpose of this paper is not to offer policy 
recommendations, one obvious policy step to take in that direction is to try and 
bring to an end the political intrusiveness from Belgrade, and create the 
conditions for suitable integration of the north into Kosova. The next part of the 
paper examines the nature and the causal mechanisms of the resistance in more 
detail. It stresses how the resistance is constructed around the three specific 
developments in the region and within Kosova, and as a phenomenon against 
American power, policies, and ideals.  
 
4. Conceptualizing Anti-Americanism in Northern Kosova 
Anti-Americanism is heterogeneous and multidimensional.72 That is, it has 
multiple aspects and is diverse in character or content, and varies among 
countries. Katzenstein and Keohane convincingly identify four different types 
of anti-Americanisms: liberal anti-Americanism, social anti-Americanism, 
                                                 
70 For instance: losing control over Kosova in 1999, Kosova Status Process from 2005 – 2008, 
Kosova‟s declaration of independence (2008), the ICJ ruling (2010), and lastly the end of super-
vised independence (2012).  
71 See Daniel McLaughlin, “Serb PM Calls for acknowledgment that control of Kosovo has been 
lost,” The Irish Times, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2013/0115/ 
1224328851555.html (accessed January 6, 2013). 
72 Katzenstein and Keohane, Anti-Americanisms, p. 11. 
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sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism, and radical anti-Americanism.73 While 
the liberal and radical anti-Americanisms are the two ends in the spectrum (the 
former almost completely innocuous and the latter much more violent), social 
anti-Americanism and sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism are concerned 
with, what Foucault identified as, social and political control. In the case under 
study, the two forms of anti-Americanisms, social and sovereign-nationalist, 
seem to be at play simultaneously, making the case not only interesting but also 
implicative for the broader literature on anti-Americanism. The Serb resistance 
is based on social values conflict equally as it is based on political values 
conflict. 
In order to appropriately conceptualize the nature of and the mechanisms 
underpinning the Serb resistance in northern Kosova we must understand how 
and via what concepts and ideals is the phenomenon constructed. As this paper 
argues, at the center of the resistance lay the Serbian elite antagonism towards 
American policy and power; hence, the construction of the resistance as a social 
and political phenomenon against Americanism. Serbian political elites (from 
Milosevic to Nikolic), joint by Serbian Orthodox Church leaders, have been 
cognizant to construct the resistance in objection to American power, policies, 
and ideals. For example, the idea of unarmed (but at times violent) resistance 
by means of blockades, cordons and roadblocks are understood as opposition 
to the American military domination. The economic „isolation‟74 of the Serbs in 
the northern Kosova is understood as a resistance to the American attempts to 
encourage and spread economic liberal values. Finally, the attempts to keep the 
northern Kosova homogenous, by not letting or threatening other nationalities 
to return to their homes75 the resistance is an objection to the American liberal 
and social ideals (e.g. human rights, minority rights, multiculturalism, and 
alike). In short, Serbian elite antagonism towards American ideals, policies and 
power are the nature of the resistance; and blockades, roadblocks, cordons, 
economic „isolation‟, and homogeneity are the mechanisms underpinning it. 
The evolution and construction of the resistance are better understood when 
looking at the three specific developments that are occurring in the region and 
within Kosova: the stationing of the American troops in Kosova, the American 
policy towards the region, and the American political and diplomatic support 
for the new state. First, Serb anti-Americanism can be directly associated with 
                                                 
73 Ibid, pp. 28-34 
74 The fact that nearly all of the trade that the Serbs in northern Kosova do is with Serbia, makes 
them almost completely an „isolated‟ economic unit. It must be noted here that this „isolatio-
nism‟ is not due to some external or structural force, rather it is a political decision influenced 
by Belgrade and made locally. 
75 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Kosovo Communities Profiles (Prishtina: 
OSCE, 2010), pp. 6-10. Accessible, http://www.osce.org/kosovo/75450 
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the American power used during NATO bombings (1999), and their current 
presence in Kosova. When American troops entered Kosova, in the framework 
of NATO, to stop extreme and criminally irresponsible policies of Milosevic 
against hundreds of thousands of civilians in Kosova,76 some commentators 
started to argue that this was an American attack on Serbian people and as such 
violating not only the international rules of the principle of sovereignty, but 
also human rights codes. Observers, such as Nebojsa Malic and Sara Flounders 
continue to argue that American-led forces in Kosova used NATO as a „tool‟ to 
establish their imperial presence in Kosova for geopolitical reasons, and to back 
the ethnic Albanian leadership in Kosova; just so that Serbia (Russia‟ natural 
ally) could be weakened.77 
American policies and power in Kosova have also been accused for and 
linked to a number of other matters. In 2008, Sara Flounders accused America 
for „stealing‟ Kosova from Serbia in an imperialistic fashion, just so it could 
have a free hand to station its troops and military equipment in Kosova, in 
Camp Bondsteel.78 According to Flounders, America planned to build the 
military camp in Kosova even before NATO intervened there, because the 
location is a strategic one as is closely located to vital oil pipelines and energy 
corridors that are now under construction, such as the American sponsored 
Trans-Balkan oil pipeline and what is known as energy Corridor 8.79 Another 
matter that Americans have been accused at is that of causing ethnic cleansing 
in post-war Kosova against Serbs and other national groups; as these minorities 
felt unsafe under American domination.80  
Although the observations by Batakovic, Flounders, and Malic play a 
significant role informing the political elites in Serbia, fourteen years on, we can 
see the payoff from the American presence in the Balkans. Wars and ethnic 
cleansing that claimed thousands of dead and hundreds of thousands forced 
out of their homes is over. The American military presence has significantly 
contributed to the stability of the region and has proved wrong the argument 
that support for the new state “will prove to be destabilizing not only for the 
region, but for the international system as a whole.”81 
Second, besides contributing to peace, Americans have made numerous 
attempts to assist Balkan states with economic and social reforms required to 
move them forward and potentially integrate them into the EU and NATO 
                                                 
76 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Aims of the Air Campaign,” NATO, http://www. 
nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/aims.htm (accessed January 6, 2013) 
77 Sara Flounders, “Mass resistance to U.S. NATO role”; Nebojsa Malic, “In Death Ground” 
78 Sara Founders, “Mass resistance to U.S. NATO role” 
79 Ibid 
80 Batakovic, “The Kosovo Dilemma.” 
81 Nikolas Gvosdev, “Kosovo and Its Discontents,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (2006): 169 – 170. 
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structures. In this context, American officials, working jointly with the EU, have 
also asked the Balkan political leaders to be more proactive and successful in 
fighting the organized crime and corruption, enforcing the rule of law, and 
bringing criminals to justice.82 While majority of states in the area have worked 
with dedication to attain these reforms and comply with these demands, Serbia 
has been sluggish, especially on matters having to do with bringing criminals 
to justice. Because such compliance is highly unpopular and controversial, 
Serbian political elites have adopted a slow and ignorant approach. When 
genocide suspect Ratko Mladic was arrested in 2011, thousands of people took 
the streets in protest against what looked like as yet another humiliation, by 
Serbian enemies, to destroy the Serbian nation on every way.83 Among these 
Serbian „enemies‟, America was depicted as the one performing the chief role. 
For some years now, American policies and priorities in the Balkans have 
been to have functional and sustainable governments in place and prepare 
them for integration into EU and NATO institutions. While Serbia has officially 
applied for EU membership in 2009, the current Serbian president Nikolic has 
already made it clear that “Serbia will never become a member of NATO.”84 At 
least four rationales appear to explain this official position. First, NATO is an 
American „dominated‟ organization. As such, the Serbian perception is that, 
Serbia will also be dominated under such organization by America. Second, the 
independence of Kosova is “NATO‟s doing.”85 Why, then, Serbia join an 
organization that has occupied part of her „territory‟? Third, the Serbian 
economic, political, and spiritual ties with Russia. The Russo-Serbian 
relationship clearly rests on long traditional ties, but the importance of 
geopolitics cannot and should not be underestimated. Lastly, American policies 
in the area are also seen in the context of globalization or „Americanization‟. 
Serb/ians see the role of American power and policies in the service of 
particular interests and not as a cosmopolitan good.86 The American military 
presence in Kosova and the American policies towards the region, concurrently 
with the fact that Serbia has no realistic chance to bring Kosova back under its 
sovereignty, can help answer the questions posed at the beginning of the paper; 
                                                 
82 Steven Woehrel, Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, (Washington DC: Congressional Rese-
arch Services, 2011), accessible at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD= ADA544307 
83 See Nic Robertson, “Clashes break out as Serbian nationalists protest arrest of Mladic,” CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/05/29/serbia.ratko.mladic/index.html 
(accessed January 6, 2013). 
84 See Robert Bridge, “Serbia says 'nyet' to NATO membership,” Russia Today, http://rt.com/ 
politics/serbia-russia-nato-eu-crisis-377/ (accessed January 7, 2013). 
85 Global Research, “Serbia will Never Join NATO,” The Center for Global Research, http://www. 
globalresearch.ca/serbia-will-never-join-nato/16912 (accessed January 6, 2013). 
86 For more on these concepts, see Stephen D Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Conse-
quences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 185-205. 
Beyond independence: Anti-Americanism and the Serb resistance in Kosova 
_____________________________ 
Iliria International Review – 2013/1 
© Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 
207 
what is Belgrade‟s reason d’être for supporting the illegal parallel structures, 
and why is Belgrade resolute to support the Serb resistance. 
The third development that informs the evolution and the construction of 
the Serb resistance is the American political and diplomatic support for the new 
state. When Kosova declared its independence in 2008, the new state was 
recognized by America the very next day. Soon after that, majority of the EU 
states followed. The new state continues to receive a great deal of economic and 
political support from America as well as significant assistance for matters 
related to building effective institutions, fighting organized crime and 
corruption, and improving ties with ethnic minorities. Such American support 
has been clearly communicated to Serbian leaders in Belgrade when Biden paid 
a visit in 2009 and urged them to cooperate with Kosova institutions, instead of 
setting up separate institutions for Kosova Serbs.87 The official American 
position on Kosova was reiterated in 2012 when Hillary Clinton visited Kosova 
and stated that America is firmly committed to Kosovo's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and that “We [Americans] oppose any discussion of 
territory changes or reopening Kosovo's independent status. These matters are 
not up for discussion. The boundaries of an independent, sovereign Kosovo are 
clear and set.”88  
To sum up, the American power, policies, and support for the new state are 
the causal mechanism that best explain the evolution and the construction of 
Serb anti-Americanism and consequently the Serb resistance in northern 
Kosova. In the eyes of political and religious elites in Belgrade and in the 
constructed minds of Serb masses in northern Kosova, America is there to 
subordinate and enslave them. To majority of them, American „imperialism‟ is 
not different from the old European kinds. The fact that America has been 
depicted as the „Fourth Reich‟89 should not come as a surprise to any of us. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has examined and explained the Serb resistance in northern 
Kosova. While the three alternative approaches to resistance, socio-biological, 
culturalist, and rationalist, appeared useful for partial explanation of the Serb 
                                                 
87 Steven Woehrel, Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, (Washington DC: Congressional Rese-
arch Services, 2010), pp 8-9. Accessible at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/  
rs21721.pdf 
88 Michael R. Gordon, “Clinton Urges Serbia to Accept Kosovo‟s Borders,” The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/world/europe/clinton-urges-serbia-to-accept-kosovo-
and-its-borders.html?_r=0 (accessed January 7, 2013) 
89 See Dan Bilefsky, “In a Divided Kosovo City, a Resounding Vow to Remain Part of Serbia,” The 
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/world/europe/19serbs.html (acce-
ssed January 7, 2013) 
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resistance in northern Kosova, more logical and plausible explanation of the 
phenomenon emerges when the resistance is examined via the theoretical lens 
of anti-Americanism. This paper has argued that the Serb resistance in northern 
Kosova is a Serbian elite construct, made of and crammed with anti-
Americanism sentiments. This constructed anti-Americanism is certainly 
complex in nature and by and large rests on three specific developments: the 
American presence in Kosova, the American policies towards the region, and 
the American political and diplomatic support for the new state.  
As it was stressed in the pages above, the Serb anti-Americanism is northern 
Kosova is important for numerous reasons, including regional security and 
socio-economic development. However, this case study is also significant for 
the larger debate on anti-Americanism. While the image of America, according 
to Pew Global Attitudes Project, has improved significantly since 2008, in the case 
of Serbs it went in the opposite direction. The year 2008, as the paper illustrated 
above, was the year when Serb anti-Americanism developed into the second 
phase and became much more unpredictable. If anti-Americanisms around the 
world, including the one just explained, were associated with George W. Bush‟s 
policies, then what accounts for the continuity or further development of anti-
Americanisms in post-Bush world? This is a matter that needs new research. 
Finally, the Serb anti-Americanism and the resistance in northern Kosova 
must be carefully and effectively controlled. The anti-Americanism in northern 
Kosova can easily slither into a radicalized mode and ultimately turn violent. 
To effectively control, if not eliminate, the Serb anti-Americanism, American 
diplomats and policy-makers must draw strategies and make policies that 
attack the roots of the problem. On the other hand, the resistance is also of great 
immediate concern since it prohibits a number of positive developments both 
within Kosova and the region. In relation to this matter, more must be done 
both by American and EU officials to stop the illegal parallel structures in 
northern Kosova and pave the way for full integration of this area into the 
larger state apparatus. The Serb resistance in northern Kosova can be effectively 
controlled or eliminated only after the Serb anti-Americanism as an elite 
construct is put at rest.  
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